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Rule-Following and the Evolution
of Basic Conceptsq1Jeffrey A. Barrett*y
This article concerns how rule-following behavior might evolve, how an old evolved rule
might come to be appropriated to a new context, and how simple concepts might co-
evolve with rule-following behavior. In particular, we consider how the transitive infer-
ential rule-following behavior exhibited by pinyon and scrub jays might evolve in the
context of a variety of the Skyrms-Lewis signaling game, then how such a rule might
come to be appropriated to carry out inferences regarding stimuli different from those
involved in the original evolution of the rule, and how this appropriation involves a step
toward the evolution of basic ordinal concepts.
1. Introduction. There is a long philosophical tradition of puzzling over
how one might learn and follow an abstract rule.1 Part of the puzzle con-
cerns how it is possible to apply a rule in a context that one never consid-
ered when initially learning the rule. Here we consider how rule-following
behavior might evolve and how an old evolved rule might evolve to be ap-
propriated to a new context. This will also provide an account of how basic
concepts might coevolve with an increasingly general rule that character-
izes the concepts.
We start by considering the transitive rule-following behavior exhib-
ited by pinyon and scrub jays and how such rule-following behavior might
evolve in the context of a variety of the Skyrms-Lewis signaling game.2 Then
we consider how a rule evolved in this way might come to be appropriated to1. See Kripke (1982) for a standard introduction to such puzzles.
2. See Lewis (1969) and Skyrms (2010) for basic descriptions of signaling games in the
context of classical (Lewis) and evolutionary (Skyrms) games.
*To contact the author, please write to: Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science,
University of California, Irvine, CA 92697; e-mail: jabarret@uci.edu.
yI would like to thank Brian Skyrms and Cailin O’Connor for discussions on the topic of this
article and an anonymous reviewer for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.
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2 JEFFREY A. BARRETTa context different from that in which it initially evolved by simple rein-
forcement with punishment, an evolutionary process similar to the one that
evolved the rule in the first place but much more efficient than evolving a new
rule from scratch. This appropriation of the old rule to a new context involves
the evolution of an analogy between the old and the new contexts. In this
case, the evolution of such an analogy can be thought of as a step toward the
evolution of basic ordinal concepts that fall under an increasingly general tran-
sitive ordering rule.3
2. The Curious Behavior of Jays. Pinyon jays gymnorhinus cyanocepha-
lus and scrub jays aphelocoma californica are two of several species of an-
imal that have evolved to exhibit transitive rule-following behaviors. Such
rule-following behavior is illustrated in an experiment reported by Bond,
Kamil, and Balda (2003).4
In their experiment, seven stimulus colors were arranged in a random
linear order that was fixed for each bird. For one of the birds, for exam-
ple, the order might be red, green, blue, magenta, yellow, cyan, and orange.
Over the course of the experiment, the birds were presented with two keys,
each illuminated with a different color. If a bird pecked the key illuminated
with the higher-ranked color, then it was rewarded with its favorite food,
pine nuts for pinyon jays and meal worms for scrub jays.
The experiment had two parts. In the first part, the birds were presented
with only adjacent color pairs: red and green, green and blue, . . . , or cyan
and orange. The birds were given daily sessions of 36 trials each, with the
position of the higher-ranked stimulus randomized between left and right
keys on each trial. And new color pairs were gradually added as the birds
exhibited success in correctly selecting higher-ranked colors. Each of the
birds was eventually required to track all six adjacent color pairs.
The pinyon jays reached a success rate of 0.80 in an average of 68 ses-
sions, and after 100 sessions their accuracy was better than 0.85. The scrub
jays learned significantly more slowly but eventually reached a similar level
of accuracy.
In the second part of the experiment, the birds were also presented with
nonadjacent color pairs. They were given 40 daily sessions of 36 trials each.
During each session, they were presented with familiar, adjacent pairs of3. The aim of the current article is to provide an explicit reinforcement model for the
appropriation of a rule to a new context and discuss how such a model allows for the evo-
lution of basic concepts. It also allows for a general evolutionary account of the compo-
sition of basic rules. The composition of rules is discussed briefly in Barrett (2013a) and
is the focus of Barrett (2014a).
4. See also Barrett (2013a) for additional details regarding this and related experiments.
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RULE-FOLLOWING AND BASIC CONCEPTS 3colors on 33 trials and novel, nonadjacent pairs on three trials. The empir-
ical question for this part of the experiment was whether the birds would
be able to determine the order of the nonadjacent color pairs on the basis of
what they had learned from their experience with just the adjacent color
pairs.
They were able to do so. Indeed, both species immediately exhibited a
high level of accuracy on the trials involving the nonadjacent colors. The
pinyon jays chose the correct color, as determined by the color order the ex-
perimenters initially assigned to the bird, on the nonadjacent pairs with an
accuracy of 0.86, and for the scrub jays 0.77. The experimenters concluded
that the birds were making transitive inferences on the basis of prior experi-
ence. But the birds were doing more than that.
A nonadjacent color judgment was taken to be correct in the experiment
if and only if it agreed with the linear ordering the experimenters initially
assigned to the bird, but the pairwise relation between adjacent colors that
the birds learned in the first part of the experiment when presented with
only adjacent colors does not by itself determine any relation whatsoever
over the nonadjacent colors. Hence, the birds were both constructing a full
linear color order from the partial information provided by just the non-
adjacent color pairs and appropriating a previously acquired rule to make
transitive inferences on the basis of this full linear order.
3. A Simple Sender-Predictor Game. We consider the evolution of tran-
sitive rule-following and its subsequent appropriation to a new task in two
steps: first, we consider how an agent might evolve a rule for transitive infer-
ence, then we consider how the agent might evolve to apply the old evolved
rule to a new context. We start with a simple sender-predictor game.
In the simplest sort of sender-predictor game, a variety of the Skyrms-
Lewis signaling game, there are two agents, a sender and a receiver who
makes predictions on the basis of the sender’s signal. The sender observes
the state of nature, then sends a signal. The receiver, who cannot observe
nature directly, performs a predictive action on the basis of the signal that
either matches the future state of nature and is successful or does not match
the future state of nature and is unsuccessful. If the act is successful, then
the disposition that led to each agent’s last action is reinforced; otherwise, it
is not reinforced and may be weakened.
All it means for an action to be successful in the context of such a game
is that it generates a result that, given the nature of the world that the agents
inhabit and the agents’ second-order dispositions to update their first-order
dispositions to signal and to act, leads to the reinforcement of those first-
order dispositions that produced the action; similarly, all it means for an ac-
tion to be unsuccessful is that, given the nature of the world and the agents’11995.proof.3d 3 Achorn International 08/02/2014 5:24AM
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4 JEFFREY A. BARRETTsecond-order dispositions, it generates a result that does not lead to the re-
inforcement of the first-order dispositions that produced the action.5
The second-order dispositions of the agents determine what resources
they start with and how they learn using these resources. As a concrete ex-
ample, consider four equally likely states of nature (0) sun, (1) fog, (2) rain,
and (3) snow; four possible signals A, B, C, and D; and four predictive
actions (0) bring sunglasses, (1) bring flashlights, (2) bring umbrellas, and
(3) bring snowshoes. Further, suppose that the agents learn by bounded re-
inforcement with punishment.
More specifically, suppose that the sender has an urn corresponding to
each of the four states of nature. Each urn contains balls corresponding to
each of the four signal types. The receiver has an urn corresponding to each
signal type, and each of these urns contains balls corresponding to each
possible action (see fig. 1). The sender observes the state of nature, draws
a random ball from the corresponding urn, then sends the signal indicated
by the ball. The receiver sees the signal, draws a ball from the correspond-
ing urn, then performs the action indicated by the ball. If the action is suc-
cessful—if the action matches the future state of nature given the agents’
second-order dispositions—then agents put the ball back into the urn they
drew it from and add a ball of the same type unless there are already 1,000
balls of that type in the urn. If the action is unsuccessful—if the action does
not match the future state of nature—then the agents do not return the ball
they drew to the urn they drew it from unless it was the last ball of its type,
in which case they simply return that ball.6
The agents’ signals are meaningless when they begin to play this game,
but as the sender’s dispositions to signal (conditional on the state of nature)
and the receiver’s dispositions to act (conditional on the sender’s signal)
evolve, the sender’s signals become meaningful in the precise sense of serv-
ing as a reliable basis for successful coordinated action. More specifically,
on this evolutionary game, the sender and receiver start off randomly sig-
naling and randomly acting. But, as they learn from experience, the sender
and receiver typically (0.993) evolve a set of nearly optimal (0.994) dis-
positions (on 1,000 runs with 1  106 plays on each run). A slightly more5. For discussions of Skyrms-Lewis signaling games and sender-predictor variants,
see, e.g., Lewis (1969), Skyrms (2006, 2010), Barrett (2007, 2009, 2013b, and 2014b),
and Argiento et al. (2009). See also Skyrms (2000) for an early model for the evolu-
tion of inferential behavior in a signaling game. While we are considering evolution in
the context of a learning dynamics, there are population models that exhibit analogous
features.
6. There are a number of different learning dynamics one might consider. See Roth and
Erev (1995) for a discussion of other closely related options.
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RULE-FOLLOWING AND BASIC CONCEPTS 5subtle game allows for the coevolution of both a representation of states
and transitive rule-following behavior.
4. A Model for the Evolution of a Transitive Rule. Consider a signaling
game involving two senders, a left coder and a right coder, and an actor
(see fig. 2). Together, the two coders and the actor might be thought of as
the internal functional components of the representational system of a sin-
gle agent. Two colors are randomly selected from a preordered set of seven
colors with each pair of colors equally likely. One color is presented to the
left coder, and the other is presented to the right coder. A play of the game is
successful if the actor makes an order judgment, say thumbs-up (a > b),
thumbs-down (a < b), or palm-down (a = b), that corresponds to the order in
nature of the colors presented to the coders.
In this model, we consider a more sophisticated variety of learning than
in the last.7 Each agent’s urn begins with just a single black ball. Each coder
draws a ball at random from the urn that corresponds to the color of its re-
spective stimulus. If the ball is black, a new signal type is invented and sent
to the actor; otherwise, a signal of the type of the drawn ball is sent to the
actor. The actor has an urn corresponding to each pair of signals the coders
might send. Each of these urns begins with a single ball of each action type:
a > b, a < b, and a = b. If successful, the ball drawn from each urn is returned,
and a new ball of that signal or act type is added to the urn; otherwise, the
ball drawn from each urn is just returned. Finally, newly invented signal
types are only kept if they lead to a successful action the first time they are
used.87. See Argiento et al. (2009) and Alexander, Skyrms, and Zabell (2012) for discussions
of this invention-learning rule and its properties.
8. This game, like the last, presupposes that agents can identify different states of nature
and different signals. See Jäger (2007) and O’Connor (2014) for recent discussions regard-
ing how categories might evolve. The current story might then be understood as explain-
ing how such evolved categories might subsequently be employed to evolve basic con-
cepts associated with a particular general rule.
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They initially send these newly minted signals at random, and the actor ini-
tially acts randomly. But the composite system typically evolves to produce
nearly uniform successful action. Specifically, after 1  107 plays, the cu-
mulative success rate is typically (0.99) better than 0.75, and, in general, the
more plays, the better the cumulative success rate. If one only requires that
the system evolve the distinction between a ≥ b and a < b, then after 1 107
plays the cumulative success rate is typically (0.97) over 0.80, which is ap-
proximately the same accuracy exhibited by the jays.9 In each case, the sys-
tem invents an internal language that represents the possible states of nature
and coevolves a rule that linearly orders these states.
The representational system that evolves when the game is played with
the full set of color pairs illustrates how it is possible for an agent to evolve
an internal representation of the linear color ordering coded for in nature and
the second-order dispositions of the agents with relatively modest evolu-
tionary resources. In the model just described, the composite agent’s evolved
color-ordering dispositions constitute a rule that takes stimuli as input, rep-
resents the stimuli in an internal language, then outputs an action. Now we
consider how, if these evolved color-ordering dispositions are triggered by
a new type of experience, the composite agent may evolve to appropriate
the old rule to structure the new experience.
5. A Model for the Evolution of Appropriation. Suppose that a coder-
actor system has evolved a rule to represent and reliably judge the transitive9. The cumulative success rate is a function of both how successful the process is and
how quickly it gets there. It is a blunt but useful measure for comparing evolutionary
processes—in this case, the process described here that evolves the transitive rule and
the process described below that appropriates that rule to a new context.
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RULE-FOLLOWING AND BASIC CONCEPTS 7relations of colors as described in the last section. Then consider presenting
the old evolved system with a new set of stimuli that the composite system
must learn to linearly order for successful action, say a set of seven musical
tones.
The question then is whether the old system that evolved to order colors
can be appropriated to the new task of ordering tones. The short answer is
that it can if and only if the composite system can come to associate the
new stimuli appropriately with the old inputs to the old evolved ordering
system. And, it turns out, this can be accomplished by reinforcement learn-
ing on the new stimuli. Telling this part of the story provides a model for
the jays’ behavior when they appropriate an old rule of transitive inference
to the new task of ordering colors and inferring their relations.
The old color-ordering system is represented by the three boxes on the
right in figure 3. Each old coder urn represents a color, and we are sup-
posing that the old system has evolved to correctly order color stimuli. The
urns to the left correspond to the new tone stimuli. Each of the tone urns
contains a ball for each of the old color urns. When each new coder gets a
tone from nature, the coder draws a ball from the corresponding tone urn.
This ball tells the coder which old color urn to then draw from. The coder
draws a ball from the indicated color urn, then sends the indicated signal
to the actor. Since the old color-ordering system has evolved to correctly
order colors, the actor orders the signals as if the coders had observed the
colors corresponding to the color urns they drew from. Consequently, opti-
mally successful tone judgments will evolve if and only if the coders evolve
to associate tones to the corresponding color urns.
If the coders had direct access to whether they had in fact chosen the
color urns that corresponded (in the color ordering) to their tones (in the
tone ordering), then they might very quickly and easily evolve a success-
ful map from tones to colors.10 A more plausible evolutionary story, how-
ever, is one in which the only evidence the coders have concerning whether
they have the right map from tones to colors is the order of judgments the
actor in fact makes when the tones are treated as colors on each play of the
game.
Suppose that the coders learn by simple reinforcement with punishment
on the results of the actor’s judgments. More specifically, on a play of the
game, if the new coders choose balls that indicate color urns that in turn lead
the actor to correctly order the tones, then each new coder returns her ball to
the tone urn from which it was drawn and adds a copy of the same ball type;
otherwise, each new coder discards the ball she drew unless it was the last10. Indeed, in this case, on 1,000 runs, the composite system, using only simple rein-
forcement, evolves to successfully match the new tone stimuli to the corresponding old
color-ordering system with an accuracy better than 0.80 on just 1  104 plays per run.
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8 JEFFREY A. BARRETTball of its type in the urn, in which case, she simply returns it to the urn. We
suppose that the contents of the old color-ordering urns do not change on
plays of this game.11
The composite system typically (0.995) evolves to successfully match
the new tone stimuli to the corresponding old color-ordering system with
an accuracy better than 0.80 with 1,000 runs and 1  105 plays per run. The
appropriation of the old evolved rule is much more efficient than evolving
a new rule from scratch. In this case, evolving to appropriate the old order-
ing system to ordering tones is better than two orders of magnitude faster
than the initial evolution of the color-ordering system.12
The evolutionary efficiency here comes from the actor’s dispositions
already being well tuned to making successful ordering judgments with the
old stimuli. All that needs to be negotiated, then, is the map from the old to
the new stimuli.
When the evolutionary process is successful, the system evolves to treat
each tone as if it were the corresponding color in the color ordering in-
duced by the old transitive rule. The coders then have evolved an analogy
between tones and colors. And as other stimuli are similarly associated, the
linear order represented in the dispositions of the composite system evolve
to represent a linearly order over ever richer equivalence classes of stimuli.
These equivalence classes might be taken to represent basic ordinal con-
cepts under an increasingly abstract general rule that allows for transitive
inference for whatever stimuli the system has in fact evolved to associate
with these concepts.11. The dispositions representing the old rule need not be fixed, but if they do evolve,
they need to do so significantly more slowly than the process that appropriates the old
rule to the new context.
12. It also involves a less sophisticated learning dynamics. Salient to this point, adding
punishment to invention in the model that evolves the initial color ordering speeds that
evolution, but it is still two orders of magnitude slower than the evolution of the map
from tones to colors here. See Barrett (2013a) for a discussion.
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about the behavior of the jays was that when presented with only adjacent
color pairs they applied a previously acquired transitive rule to impose a
linear order on nonadjacent color pairs as well. One sees a similar phenom-
enon in the current model.
When trained on a complete, unbiased set of tone stimuli, the old tran-
sitive rule is nearly always appropriated to the new context in such a way
that the composite system is almost always successful on both adjacent
and nonadjacent tone judgments. Specifically, on the learning dynamics de-
scribed in the last section, the composite system evolves to represent the new
tone stimuli in such a way that it exhibits a mean success rate in making order
judgments on nonadjacent stimuli of 0.993 on 1,000 runs with 1  105 plays
per run.
When trained on just adjacent tones, the composite system typically
(0.766) evolves to correctly judge the order of new tone stimuli with an
accuracy of better than 0.80 on 1,000 runs with 1 105 plays per run. Much
of this success is due to the fact that the composite system evolves to do
very well in ordering the adjacent stimuli that it is trained on. But, like the
jays, the old evolved rule also induces a strong bias in how the new non-
adjacent stimuli are ordered. Specifically, the composite system evolves to
make the correct order judgments on nonadjacent tones when trained on
only adjacent tones with a mean success rate of 0.703 on 1,000 runs with
1  105 plays per run.
The detailed behavior of the model is subtle. When trained on only ad-
jacent tones, the composite system sometimes evolves to associate the new
tone stimuli with the old color stimuli in a one-to-one manner that produces
nearly perfect order judgments on the new nonadjacent stimuli, just as if
the system had been trained on a complete unbiased set of tone stimuli.13
More often, when trained on only adjacent stimuli, the new stimuli are lin-
early ordered by the old rule in contiguous patches. Tones 0–2 might, for
example, be linearly ordered and associated with the full range of colors 0–6,
tones 4–6 might be similarly ordered and also associated with the full range
of colors 0–6, and tone 3 might not be strongly ordered at all. While sub-
optimal, the composite system typically does very well in ordering adja-
cent tones and much better than chance in ordering nonadjacent tones on
such a representation.1413. Such optimal behavior is observed in approximately 1 in 50 runs of the game as
described. Even fixing the right pairwise order of the new stimuli, the coders need to be
lucky to get the relative positions of tones and their corresponding colors right early in
the evolutionary process.
14. See Bond et al. (2003) for details regarding the relative reliability of different types
of order judgments for the two species. Getting the linear order right in patches is
perhaps most similar to the behavior exhibited by the scrub jays.
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der on the new stimuli on the basis of fundamentally incomplete evidence,
evidence that itself does not entail a linear order at all. And even when such
incomplete evidence leads to a suboptimal ordering of the new stimuli, the
suboptimal ordering nearly always exhibits a strong linear bias on simu-
lation, and it is the old rule that does the work of ordering the new stimuli
in each of the linearly ordered patches.
7. Rule-Following, Analogy, and Basic Concepts. We have seen how it is
possible for simple rule-following behavior to evolve in a general sort of
signaling game. We have also seen how an old rule may evolve to be ap-
propriated to a new context and how such appropriation may be much more
efficient than evolving a new context-specific rule.
On the reinforcement model described here, the agents appropriate the
old rule to a new context by evolving an analogy between the old and the
new objects of experience in which the composite system comes to treat
the new objects of experience as if they were the old objects of experience
with respect to the old rule. As the rule is appropriated to other contexts,
new analogies are formed, and the application of the rule becomes increas-
ingly general.
In some cases the appropriation of a rule to a new context evolves a one-
to-one map from the new objects of experience to the old objects. This typ-
ically happens on the model described here when the color-ordering rule is
appropriated to ordering tones by reinforcement with punishment on the full
set of new tone stimuli.When this happens, the analogy that evolves between
the old and the new objects of experience induces equivalence classes of
objects. As the evolved rule evolves to be similarly appropriated to other
contexts, it becomes increasingly general. As the elements of each equiva-
lence class play the same role under the evolved rule, the equivalence classes
of objects induced by the evolved analogies might be thought to represent
basic concepts, where what concepts they are is determined by the increas-
ingly general rule that relates the elements of the evolved equivalent classes.
Here, the equivalence classes formed by these associations might be thought
to represent small finite ordinals that are linearly ordered under an increas-
ingly general transitive inference rule that itself evolved in the context of
promoting successful action given the agents’ second-order dispositions and
the nature of the world they inhabit.1515. In contrast, in the context of the game described in Barrett (2013b), the concepts
would be of small finite cardinals under the evolved rule of cardinal addition.
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